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1. INTRODUCTION 
In earlier eras much of ship finance was provided through individual owners funding their 
own companies.  However, more recently ship owners have sought finance from the 
capital markets.  Starting from the 1990s, shipping companies began to turn to the 
global capital markets to raise finance, through either equity or debt.  During the period 
2004 – 2007, it can be observed that there was an increased number of Initial Public 
Offerings (IPOs), secondary offerings, and issuance of high-yield bonds related to the 
shipping industry. However, since the financial crisis of 2008, bankruptcy amongst firms 
operating in the shipping industry has been a familiar theme. Corporate finance is 
therefore an important consideration within the shipping industry which remains in a 
precarious situation.  This has brought additional pressures in terms of shipping 
companies establishing sound and rigorous, as well as transparent, financial practices.  
While previously there would have been limited access to financial data about shipping 
companies, now it has become available through public databases and market 
information.  While the financial data is still to some extent limited, valuable insights can 
be obtained from analysing that, which is available, e.g. the Bloomberg Database.  
 
While issues such as corporate failure and financial performance have been well 
researched amongst those in the accountancy and finance field, its consideration within 
the shipping industry has been limited. The spotlight has been on loans (Kavussanos and 
Tsouknidis, 2011; Mitroussi et al, 2012), high-yield bonds (Grammenos, et al, 2008) or 
IPOs (Grammenos and Papapostolou, 2012).  To the best of our knowledge, no study 
discusses the insolvency of shipping firms at a company level, leaving a significant 
research gap.  There remain many unanswered questions, for example, how do shipping 
firms reach the point of failure/bankruptcy? How can the financial performance of 
shipping firms be best evaluated? And what can they do in the future to avert financial 
crisis? 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Financial distress and corporate failure  
A significant threat for many businesses, irrespective of company size or the business 
field in which they operate is corporate failure.  Business failures are economically costly 
and the market value of distressed firms generally declines in the period leading up to 
collapse (Warner, 1977; Charalambous et al, 2000).  In such circumstances not only are 
the company and its employees directly affected but so more broadly are the suppliers of 
capital, investors and creditors (Charalambous et al, 2004).  The identification of 
companies which are likely to fail is thus of interest to a range of stakeholders, and 
predicting corporate failure has been a theme of economic research for several decades 
(Aharony, 1980; Morris, 1997).  Corporate failure indicates that resource misallocation is 
likely to have occurred which is undesirable, and identifying if it is likely to occur would 
enable measures to be taken to prevent such an occurrence (Lev, 1974).  Further, 
financial distress as a concept has been used to explain how some companies have an 
increased probability of failure in situations where they cannot meet their financial 
obligations (Chan and Chen, 1991; Fama and French, 1996; Campbell et al, 2008). 
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2.2. Financial distress in shipping  
 
The shipping industry is known for its family run business in favour of traditional 
financing tools. The industry is fragmented and consists of a large number of smaller 
firms with concentrated ownership (Stopford, 2009; Tsionas et al., 2012), lack of 
transparency and limited access to the capital markets. Only since the 1990s have ship 
owners sought financing from the global capital markets (Grammenos et al., 2007; 
Merikas et al., 2009). As maritime companies have increasingly turned to the financial 
markets to raise capital they have come under closer scrutiny by investors and 
shareholders. They have strengthened their corporate structure, and they have become 
larger in size, due to their growth strategies through mergers and acquisition. A 
generation of younger shipowners began to raise finance by itilising international capital 
markets, particularly during the 1993–1997 and 2004–2007 periods. There are many 
ways of financing ships, from traditional bank lending to private placements and public 
issues of debt and equity.  They are all associated with different risks and the 
investor/lender has to make a decision based on the return in order to justify exposure to 
the risk. 
 
In relation to equity finance, Grammenos and Marcoulis (1996) were the first to 
document that an increasing number of shipping companies were accessing the capital 
market. Grammenos and Marcoulis (1996) and Grammenos and Arkoulis (1999) were 
amongst the first papers to analyse the performance of shipping IPOs in the equity 
capital markets. Cullinane and Gong (2002) studied IPOs underpricing in the 
transportation sector in the Chinese mainland and Hong Kong markets. Merikas et al. 
(2009 &2010) studied global shipping IPOs underpricing using US-listed Shipping IPOs. 
Grammenos and Papapostolou (2012) were the first to test the different theories that 
explain the underpricing phenomenon. They examined the impact of market information 
on US shipping IPOs through analysing 51 shipping US IPOs that took place in the period 
1987–2008.  They indicated that there is no asymmetry of information between 
participants in shipping IPOs and the probability of underpricing can be predicted by 
employing variables available to all IPO participants prior to the issue.  
 
In relation to debt finance, Grammenos et al (2008) argued that bankruptcy and default 
on a debt instrument represent different phases of financial distress. Grammenos and 
Arkoulis (2003) studied debt finance for shipping companies for the first time. They 
investigated determinants of the primary pricing of shipping company high yield bond 
issues. In line with Fridson and Garman (1998), they argued that when studying the 
pricing of new high yield bonds, it would be better to categorise the bonds by industry in 
order to avoid biased results. Using 30 high yield bond offerings issued by shipping 
companies in the US market during the period 1993–1998 they identified a set of 
potential determinants, with credit rating being the major determinant of the price 
spread of bond offerings. Financial leverage and shipping market conditions also account 
for a significant part of the price variability. Grammenos et al (2007) studied factors 
affecting the dynamics of yield premia on seasoned high yield bonds of shipping 
companies. They found the explanation factors to be: credit rating; term-to-maturity; 
changes in earnings in the shipping market, as well as in the yield on 10-year Treasury 
bonds; and the yield on the Merrill Lynch single-B index. While default against individual 
financial instruments can represent early phases of corporate failure, predicting overall 
failure at the firm level is worth investigating. 
 
3. DATA 
 
3.1.  Data description 
 
The data were extracted from the Bloomberg database for the period 1992 to 2014. 484 
globally listed shipping companies were selected under the marine transportation sector 
available from the Bloomberg database, of which 158 were delisted.  We apply the 
3 
 
criteria that the company must have had at least three years of full financial data prior to 
its formal failure year. The application of this criteria resulted in a sample of 20 delisted 
shipping companies. We then chose to match these delisted companies with 20 
companies that survived in the same periods and with similar size of total assets. The 
final dataset thus consists of 40 shipping companies that either survived or failed 
between 2007 and 2014.  
A large number of financial ratios were employed and tested to ascertain whether 
corporate failure of listed shipping companies could be predicted.  These ratios can be 
categorised into six groups: gearing, liquidity, profit, activity, cash flow and market. We 
further chose three industrial specific variables (dummy variables) in order to reflect the 
main business of the shipping companies: ship-owning, tramp and wet.  Ship-owning is 
used to describe whether the company owns any ships, Tramp is used to select the 
companies with tramp trades as their main business, and lastly, Wet is used to select the 
companies with oil products as their main business.  All the ratios are collected through 
six time horizons prior to failure: half year, one year, one and a half years, two years, 
two and a half years and three years before the year of failure.  
 
3.2. Financial ratios 
Ratio analysis evaluates various aspects of an organisations operating and financial 
performance, e.g. efficiency, liquidity and profitability.  For most ratios, an acceptable 
level is determined by its comparison to ratios of companies in the same industry.  Such 
ratios are generally of two types: comparison of items between years or a comparison 
between items in the same year.  The number of ratios that can be calculated is large 
and the multiplicity of available ratios means that it is important that the correct ratios 
are chosen.  For the purposes of this paper the ratios considered covered gearing, 
liquidity, profit, activity, cash flow and market and are detailed in Table 1. (Tamari, 
1978; Investopedia, 2015a). 
Table 1.  Financial ratios tested in the study 
 
Category 
 
Variable Definition 
 
Gearing Current liabilities/total assets 
 Total debt/total assets 
Liquidity Current assets/current liability 
 Current assets/total assets 
 Working capital/total assets 
Profit Earnings before interest and taxes/total assets 
 Net income/total assets (ROA) 
 Net income/shareholder’s equity (ROE) 
Activity Sales/total assets 
 Sales/current assets 
Cash flow Cash flow/total assets  
Market Market value of equity/shareholder’s equity 
 
4. Empirical results  
 
4.1. Trend analysis 
The trends of the financial ratios were compared for both active and delisted companies 
three years prior to the failure of the delisted companies. Figure 1 shows the equally 
weighted means of three representative financial ratios for the two groups of companies.  
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Figure 1. Trend of representative financial ratios 
 
Distinct differences can be observed between the two groups of companies. The total 
debt/total assets ratio increases for the delisted shipping companies as the year of failure 
approaches, while it remains relatively stable for the active companies.  This observation 
is in line with the previous corporate failure findings, where gearing is positively related 
to the probability of failure. The gross earning/total assets ratio shows a decreasing trend 
for delisted shipping companies, while it doesn’t follow any specific pattern for the active 
companies. This observation is also consistent with the previous literature, where 
profitability measures are inversely related to the probability of failure. The sales/current 
assets ratio remains relatively stable for the active companies, while it reveals an 
increasing trend for the delisted companies. This can be explained by a decrease in the 
value of current assets before failure which leads to an increasing overall ratio. 
 
4.2.  Univariate analysis 
 
To examine the predictive ability of the financial ratios, the significance of the individual 
variables was tested through univariate logistic regression, to uncover which of these 
variables might be empirically important in explaining corporate failure before they might 
be considered simultaneously for multivariate analysis. For convenience only the 
significant variables in this screening stage are reported.  
 
Among the possible financial variables the only variable that is found to have a significant 
impact on explaining corporate failure is ‘gearing’, as measured by the total debt/assets 
ratio. Table 2 shows that regardless of the choice of the data quoted in terms of the time 
before the delisted companies are ‘dead’ (with an exception of the choice of ‘3 years 
before’ where none of these variables is found to be significant). The estimated 
coefficients for this variable all have the expected (positive) sign that indicates that a rise 
in the debt-to-assets ratio tends to imply a higher probability of failure as omened by 
exacerbated financial burden. The McFadden R-squared and H-L statistics are both within 
reasonable boundaries for this baseline model to be considered acceptable. 
 
While previous literature shows that financial leverage/gearing variables provide the 
highest univariate classification accuracy (Charitou et al, 2007), this finding seems to 
distinguish itself from many existing findings in the literature that corporate failure might 
also be predicted by many other factors besides gearing, such as liquidity, profitability 
and cash flow (see Charitou et al, 2004 and Grammenos et al, 2008 for examples). At 
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this point it can be concluded that the gearing ratio shows a consistent and robust 
significance in prediction corporate failure of listed shipping firms. 
 
Table 2. Univariate regressions 
     
 
          
  Time before failure 
Regressors 6 mths 1 yr 1.5 yrs 2 yrs 2.5 yrs 3 yrs 
Gearing 
      
TD/TA 4.408** 3.815** 3.521** 3.423** 4.16** 2.33 
 
(2.001) (1.68) (1.657) (1.678) (1.845) (1.672) 
Constant -1.86** -1.617** -1.671** -1.489* -2.11** -1.279 
 
(0.902) (0.804) (0.782) (0.77) (0.928) (0.783) 
McFadden 
R^2 0.153 0.131 0.135 0.109 0.155 0.053 
H-L statistic 6.258 [0.618] 7.633 [0.469] 7.697 [0.464] 3.029 [0.933] 5.549 [0.698] 8.8176 [0.358] 
Obs:  34 34 35 32 30 29 
 
 
In order to capture sector-specific factors in the shipping industry, three variants of the 
baseline model above were tested, by adding to it in each case a shipping industry-
specific dummy, representing the main business of the shipping companies, to see if any 
of these would improve the model’s fit. The three dummy variables considered were 
‘ship-owning’, ‘tramp’ and ‘wet’, where ‘ship’=1 represents the case in which the 
company owns ships, ‘tramp’=1 means the company is involved with tramp trades as 
their main business and ‘wet’=1 means the company is involved with oil products as their 
main business 
 
Overall, the screening exercise suggests: Firstly, any analysis with data quoted as ‘3 
years’ before failure fails to establish a correlation between the probability of corporate 
failure and normal financial variables. Hence we can conclude that it is difficult to predict 
failure for shipping companies three years ahead, it would only be sensible to use 
historical data with shorter time horizon (i.e. less than 3 years) to predict corporate 
failure in shipping companies. Secondly, the main business of the shipping company, i.e., 
whether a company owns ships or whether it operates in tramp trades, matters when it 
comes to financial failure, and they have the potential of improving the significance of 
some financial variables under the ‘6 months before’ category. Thirdly, gearing, 
measured as total debt-to-assets ratio is found to be significant and robust in different 
variants of model and it has the best goodness-of-fit under the ‘6 months before’ 
category with the inclusion of ‘ship’.  
 
4.3. Marginal effect 
 
Having identified five model variants that are robust in predicting corporate failure using 
the debt-to-assets ratio measured at different times with reference to the bankrupted 
firms’ delisted dates, how the probability of failure varies can be evaluated, in each 
model variant, along with the variation in the debt-to-assets ratio, i.e., the marginal 
effect of debt-to-assets ratio on the firms’ failure probability. 
 
One important feature of the marginal effect in logistic regression analysis, compared to 
the usual linear regression analysis, is that the marginal impact of an explanatory 
variable on the dependent variable, as measured by the ‘slope parameter’ in linear 
regression analysis, is not fixed but a function of both the slope parameter and the 
values at which all the explanatory variables are measured, due to the non-linear 
relationship between the dependent and explanatory variable(s) as reflected by the 
logistic model structure. In other words, the non-linear relationship between the 
dependent and explanatory variable(s) determines that the change in the probability of 
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failure would be different should the same amount of change in an explanatory variable 
be caused upon different starting levels.  
 
This can be seen clearly from figure 2 below the probability of failure against the 
significant financial variable is plotted, the debt-to-assets ratio, as identified with data 
measured at the different reference points. It can be seen that while a higher debt-to-
assets ratio leads to higher probability of failure in all cases (as determined by the 
positive coefficients of TD/TA as reported in Table 2 above), the varying slopes on each 
response function suggest the responsiveness of failure probability with respect to ‘a unit 
change’ in the debt-to-assets ratio varies at different gearing levels. The most obvious of 
these is when the model is estimated using data reported 6 months before the 
bankruptcy dates, where, for example, when the debt ratio is close to 0%, a 10% rise in 
the ratio would only cause a 4% rise in the failure probability, whereas when the debt 
ratio has reached a ‘cautionary’ level, say 40%, a 10% rise on top of this would cause 
the failure probability to rise significantly, by as much as 19%; the sensitive response 
then slows down again substantially when the debt level has passed a ‘critical’ point, at 
about 70% of the total assets. The other model variants, by the nature of the model 
setting, also display similar properties of varying responsiveness, although compared to 
the ‘6-month before’ version their responsiveness is much more ‘linear’; that is, they 
imply much less drastic changes in failure probability when the debt ratio varies. 
 
 
Figure 2.  Marginal effect of debt-to-assets ratio on failure probability 
 
Interestingly, Figure 2 shows all but the ‘2.5-year before’ variant suggest a response 
function that intersects each other when the debt ratio is near 40%; at this level the 
probability of failure is about 50% which is usually taken as the threshold/critical point in 
binary logistic analysis. Here, these variants seem to roughly agree that a debt-to-assets 
ratio at around 40% is notable – this contrasts to our trend analysis (figure 1) where the 
average debt ratio of delisted firms was mostly kept above 50% while that of active firms 
was just above 30%. The ‘6-month before’ variant predicts much higher (lower) 
probabilities of failure beyond (below) this critical point compared to the others whose 
predictions are not substantially different. The ‘2.5-year before’ variant suggests a 
somewhat higher critical point, at about 50%; its prediction is otherwise fairly similar to 
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the others’ (except for that of the ‘6-month before’ variant), although below such a 
critical point its predicted failure probabilities are consistently lower by some 8-10%.  
 
While we have identified five model variants that are robust in predicting corporate 
failure, it should be noted that these logistic models were only estimated with limited 
observations. Hence we have carried out In and out of sample tests to validate the 
robustness of our models. The results of In and Out of sample tests can be obtained on 
request.  
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we analysed how financial and industry specific variables can be used to 
predict corporate failure in listed shipping companies through the use of binary logit 
model.  Through trend analysis, univariate regressions, gearing, profit and activity were 
found to be useful in predicting corporate failure in listed shipping companies. We also 
conclude that it is difficult to predict failure 3 years prior to bankruptcy.  The best time 
horizon to predict corporate failure in shipping is 6 months. Our paper further examines 
the different characteristics of financial risks in shipping through marginal effect analysis.  
If the gearing ratio increases to above 40% and remains in the 40% to 70% range it 
would appear that failure is more likely to occur.  
 
In light of the above, these findings will be of interest to traders and investors in shipping 
markets, as well as banks and shipowners in the ship finance sector.  The publicly 
available nature of the information used to compile this research means that traders and 
investors (both individual and corporate) are now able to use an easily accessible source 
of data to make their judgements about investing in the shipping industry.  In addition 
ship owners are able to identify the factors that they need to focus on in order to 
understand more effectively the financial performance of their company.   
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